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Stadium-style seating, first introduced in the mid-1990s, gives
moviegoers a dramatically improved viewing experience, offering bet-
ter sightlines and larger screens than traditional movie theaters.' Be-
cause the steep incline of stadium-style rows prevents ramping, wheel-
chair seating is often placed in the very front rows of theaters. This
configuration denies wheelchair patrons the superior viewing experi-
ences that their able-bodied counterparts enjoy and, in the view of
many courts, violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2
The ADA requires that places of public accommodation (which
include movie theaters)3 provide "full and equal enjoyment of... ser-
vices" to disabled persons. To implement and enforce this require-
ment, the Department of Justice, pursuant to statutory mandate,' is-
sued regulations construing "equal enjoyment" to require that seating
plans in places of public accommodation offer wheelchair users "lines
of sight comparable" to those of their able-bodied counterparts.
The Justice Department's interpretation of its own regulations
concludes that most stadium-style theaters do, in fact, violate the
ADA. It contends that, in the movie theater context, comparability of
lines of sight encompasses viewing angles to the screen, and that
t B.S.ES. 2000, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate 2005,The University of Chicago.
I See United States v Hoyts Cinemas Corp, 256 F Supp 2d 73, 78 (D Mass 2003), appeal
pending, No 03-1646 (1st Cir argued Feb 6,2004) (presenting a factual overview of stadium-style
seating in American movie theaters).
2 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC § 12101 et seq (2000) (stating that the statute's
purpose is, among other things, "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and regulate commerce, in order to address the ma-
jor areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities").
3 42 USC § 12181(2), (7)(C) (including "a motion picture house, theater, concert hall,
stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment" within the scope of "public
accommodations").
4 42 USC § 12182(a) ("No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disabil-
ity in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases
to), or operates a place of public accommodation.").
5 See 42 USC § 12186(b) (requiring the Attorney General to enact regulations to enforce
the ADA).
6 See 28 CFR Part 36 Appendix A § 4.33.3 (2003) (providing the Justice Department's
regulations implementing the ADA).
1109
The University of Chicago Law Review
wheelchair seating, when confined to the front, non-stadium sections
of the theater, provides universally poor and uncomfortable viewing
angles. Because able-bodied patrons have a choice of seats, the vast
majority of which provide excellent viewing angles, the Justice De-
partment argues that stadium-style movie theaters do not provide
comparable lines of sight and thus violate the ADA.
Courts adopting this interpretation have done so on the basis of
deference to the Justice Department's interpretation of its own regu-
lation rather than the "plain" meaning of the language "lines of sight
comparable."9 Other courts have been reluctant to adopt this argu-
ment, pointing to a different interpretation of the same regulation by
the Justice Department in the context of wheelchair seating in athletic
arenas. ° The first court of appeals to rule on this issue, relying on these
athletic arena cases, determined that wheelchair users need only be af-
forded unobstructed views of the screen to comply with the "lines of
sight comparable" requirement." Recent decisions, however, have re-
pudiated this "unobstructed view" rationale, finding both that the Jus-
tice Department's interpretation is truer to the ADA's purpose and
that its interpretation is entitled to deference from the courts.
2
This Comment attempts to resolve the current split between the
circuits by expanding on the rationale underlying the Justice Depart-
ment's interpretation of the ADA. The design of many stadium-style
theaters severely disadvantages disabled movie patrons vis-A-vis able-
bodied patrons, in many instances providing able-bodied customers
7 See Brief for the United States as Appellee/Cross-Appellant, United States v Hoyts
Cinemas Corp, Civil Action Nos 03-1646,03-1787,03-1808, *25 (1st Cir filed Oct 2,2003) (Justice
Department Hoyts Brief). Generally accepted theater design principles indicate that viewing an-
gles of greater than 30 degrees cause viewer discomfort and thus a less enjoyable viewing experi-
ence; wheelchair seats in many stadium-style theaters have viewing angles of greater than 30 de-
grees, where the general seating has viewing angles that are far less steep. Id at *9-20.
8 Id.
9 See, for example, Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America v Regal Cinema.s Inc, 339 F3d
1126, 1133 (9th Cir 2003), cert denied as Regal Cinemas, Inc v Stewmon, 72 USLW 3310 (2004).
10 See, for example, Lara v Cinemark USA, Inc, 207 F3d 783,789 (5th Cir 2000) (rejecting
an ADA challenge to stadium-style theaters on the ground that only unobstructed views, not
qualitatively similar viewing angles, are required). In the context of wheelchair seating in athletic
stadiums, several courts have considered whether the Justice Department regulations require
that wheelchair users have lines of sight over standing spectators. See, for example, Paralyzed
Veterans of America v DC Arena, LP, 117 F3d 579, 583-85 (DC Cir 1997) (finding that wheel-
chair seats must have lines of sight over standing spectators in athletic arenas because the phrase
"lines of sight comparable" is reasonably interpreted as requiring an unobstructed view). See
Part II.B.2.
11 Lara, 207 F3d at 789 (holding that because there was no evidence that the Justice De-
partment's regulations imposed a viewing angle requirement at the time they were promulgated,
the court would not read such a requirement into the regulation).
12 See, for example, Regal, 339 F3d at 1132-33 (rejecting the Lara decision); Hoyts, 256 F
Supp 2d at 87-88; United States v AMC Entertainment, Inc, 232 F Supp 2d 1092,1110-12 (CD Cal
2002).
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viewing experiences vastly superior to those offered to wheelchair us-
ers." Part I of this Comment discusses the background and purpose of
the ADA (specifically Title III, the public accommodations provision),
and describes the statutory and regulatory scheme that landed the Jus-
tice Department in an implementation and enforcement role. Part II
focuses on the recent conflicting decisions on the legality of stadium-
style theaters, concentrating on the main arguments posed by the liti-
gants: whether the Justice Department is entitled to deference for its
interpretation of its regulations implementing the ADA; whether
placement of wheelchair seats in the front of stadium-style auditori-
ums isolates and segregates wheelchair users, a further violation of the
ADA and the Justice Department's regulations; and whether the Jus-
tice Department is justified in pressing its interpretation of the regula-
tions through litigation rather than rulemaking. Part III proposes that
the Justice Department's argument should prevail, and grapples with
the issue of whether this interpretation should be applied retroac-
tively, requiring the retrofitting of existing theaters that are in viola-
tion of the ADA. Finally, the Comment considers the effect that the
Justice Department's method of promoting its interpretation (through
litigation rather than rulemaking) has and will have on this issue and
area of law, and suggests that courts should hold the Justice Depart-
ment to its rulemaking obligation rather than allow it to define the le-
gal standard through a litigation campaign.
I. STATUTORY SCHEME: THE ROLE OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
The statutory scheme underlying the ADA is key to understand-
ing the controversy surrounding wheelchair seating in stadium-style
theaters and the conflicting interpretations of the ADA's implement-
ing regulations. Regulatory authority and enforcement of the ADA
lies with the Justice Department, and its role in formulating these
regulations, its interpretive stance, and its attempts to enforce the
ADA are all central to this issue.
13 Note that the theater companies have in a way created this problem for themselves. In
the absence of these improved stadium-style auditoriums, the comparability bar would not be so
high-challenges to wheelchair seating placement in traditional theaters historically failed. See,
for example, Fiedler v American Multi-Cinema, Inc, 871 F Supp 35 (D DC 1994) (denying a chal-
lenge by a wheelchair user to the placement of wheelchair seating entirely in the back row of a
theater). It is only because of the "stark contrast between stadium and traditional seating" that
this question has become pressing. Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 79 n 5. Theater owners contend that
ADA compliance required them to develop stadium-style theaters: the maximum slope allowed
by the regulations was too gradual to provide optimum viewing angles in traditional theater con-
figurations, thus the move to stadium-style auditoriums. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cinemark
USA, Inc v United States, Civil Action No 03-1131, *4 n 2 (filed Feb 4, 2004) (available on West-
law at 2004 WL 239389) (Cinemark Petition).
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A. Statutory and Regulatory Authority: The ADA and the
Justice Department
The ADA was enacted on July 26, 1990 to combat discrimination
against persons with disabilities. Congress held lengthy hearings and
made detailed findings as to the pressing need to integrate the dis-
abled into the workforce and public accommodations of society.14 Title
III of the ADA, which addresses public accommodations," provides
that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of dis-
ability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public ac-
commodation."'6 Challenges to the design of stadium-style movie thea-
ters allege that these theaters violate the ADA by failing to design and
construct theater auditoriums "that are readily accessible to and us-
able by individuals with disabilities," namely wheelchair users."
Implementation of Title III of the ADA was delegated by Con-
gress to the Justice Department. The Attorney General was instructed
to set forth regulations to carry out the provisions of the Act by July
26, 1991, one year after its enactment. 8 At minimum, these regulations
were required to be consistent with guidelines that the Architectural
and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board) was
to issue within nine months of the enactment of the ADA." Rather
14 See 42 USC § 12101(a)(6) (finding that disabled Americans were "severely disadvan-
taged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally" by discrimination, and stating a
purpose of remedying the isolation and segregation suffered by the disabled).
15 See 42 USC §§ 12181-83. Public accommodations include movie theaters. 42 USC
§ 12181(2), (7)(C).
16 42 USC § 12182(a).
17 42 USC § 12183(a)(1) (defining discrimination by public accommodations to include "a
failure to design and construct facilities ... that are readily accessible to and usable by individu-
als with disabilities" except where structurally impracticable). While many people with disabili-
ties obviously face more serious obstacles than bad seats in movie theaters, the experience of
wheelchair users in stadium-style theaters is representative of the stigma the ADA seeks to
eliminate. Wheelchair users "suffer from a sense of embarrassment and isolation from being
relegated to a section of the theater where no one else is sitting ... [and] have described feelings
of anger and humiliation, or report a feeling of being watched because everyone else in the audi-
ence is behind them." United States v AMC Entertainment, Inc, 232 F Supp 2d 1092,1104 (CD Cal
2002). For further discussion of the role of stigma, see Note, Civil Rights-Americans with Dis-
abilities Act-Ninth Circuit Holds That Movie Theaters Must Provide Comparable Viewing Angles
for Patrons in Wheelchairs. - Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339
F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), 117 Harv L Rev 727,730-33 (2003); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordina-
tion, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 Va L Rev 397,436-45 (2000).
18 42 USC § 12186(b).
19 42 USC § 12186(c). The Access Board was established in 1968 to ensure compliance with
the precursor to the ADA, the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 USC § 4151 et seq (2000).
The Access Board is charged with establishing and maintaining minimum guidelines and re-
quirements for carrying out the Architectural Barriers Act, the ADA, and other laws providing
greater accessibility for the physically disabled. See 29 USC § 792(b) (2000). The guidelines the
Access Board issued to enforce the ADA supplemented the existing "Minimum Guidelines and
Requirements for Accessible Design" already in place pursuant to the Architectural Barriers
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than creating its own distinct set of regulations, the Justice Depart-
ment adopted the Access Board guidelines (the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG)) in their entirety as
its regulations implementing the ADA.nO The Justice Department regu-
lations are entitled the "Standards for Accessible Design"
(Standards) .21
Standard 4.33.3 is the genesis of the controversy about stadium-
style theaters. It states that "[w]heelchair areas shall be an integral
part of any fixed seating plan and shall be provided so as to provide
people with physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and lines
of sight comparable to those for members of the general public.' 'n In
the context of stadium-style theaters, the question is whether the
"lines of sight comparable" language of Standard 4.33.3 requires that
viewing angle be taken into account in seat placement such that
wheelchair-accessible seats in the theater have viewing angles compa-
rable in quality to the majority of non-wheelchair seat placements, or
whether comparability is achieved by situating wheelchair seat place-
ments anywhere in the auditorium so long as they are among the gen-
eral seating. The Justice Department and disabled patrons who have
brought lawsuits challenging the design of stadium-style theaters ar-
gue that placing wheelchair seating at the very front of theaters does
not provide comparable lines of sight because of the disparity in view-
ing angles; theater owners argue that current placements comply with
the Standards because wheelchair-accessible seats need only be
among the general seating and have unobstructed views.
The resolution of these conflicting interpretations turns on the
question of deference to the Justice Department's interpretation of
Standard 4.33.3. The Justice Department interprets Standard 4.33.3 "to
require, inter alia, that a theater operator provide wheelchair users
with lines of sight within the range of viewing angles offered to most
patrons in the theater."2 The Justice Department also contends that
Act. See 42 USC § 12204(a).
20 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Com-
mercial Facilities, 56 Fed Reg 7452, 7478-79 (Feb 22, 1991) (providing notice of the Justice De-
partment's intent to adopt the ADAAG in toto, including commentary).
21 28 CFR Part 36, Appendix A. Because the Standards adopted the ADAAG in toto, these
two regulations are often referred to interchangeably by courts and commentators. There are,
however, important differences between the Standards and the ADAAG, see Part III.A.4; this
Comment will differentiate between the two as appropriate.
22 28 CFR Part 36, Appendix A § 4.33.3 (emphasis altered).
23 See Lara v Cinemark USA, Inc, 207 F3d 783,788 (5th Cir 2000) (describing theater own-
ers' contention that the comparability requirement is met because "wheelchair areas are... lo-
cated in the midst of general seating and do not suffer from any obstructions").
24 Justice Department Hoyts Brief at *25 (cited in note 7) (emphasis added). The Access
Board reads this argument to require wheelchair seats' viewing angle to be "equivalent to or bet-
ter than the viewing angles ... provided by 50 percent of the seats in the auditorium." Architec-
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many older stadium-style theaters, which place wheelchair seating ex-
clusively in the front of the auditorium, violate another provision of
Standard 4.33.3 that requires that "[w]heelchair areas shall be an inte-
gral part of any fixed seating plan.""' This "integrality provision" en-
sures that wheelchair placements will not be isolated from the general
seating, a safeguard that the Justice Department contends is thwarted
by placement of wheelchair seating only at the front of the
auditoriums:
The Department construes the "integral" seating mandate of
Standard 4.33.3 to require that theater operators provide wheel-
chair seating in the area of the theater where most members of
the general public usually choose to sit. In the typical stadium-
style movie theater, a large majority of the patrons can be ex-
pected to sit in the stadium section."
Finally, the Justice Department contends that its interpretation of
Standard 4.33.3 has been consistent and known to the theaters since
the Standard's promulgation in 1991, or at least since it publicized this
interpretation in the first case considering this question. Thus, theaters
must retrofit noncomplying auditoriums, as they knew that these audi-
toriums were not in compliance with Standard 4.33.3 when the audito-
riums were constructed.
B. Factual Background: "Older" and "Newer"
Stadium-Style Theaters
Stadium-style theaters are designed to mimic the superior view-
ing angles provided in athletic arenas and stadiums, where rows are
placed on risers at intervals of twelve to eighteen inches. This design
both eliminates the problem of obstruction of views by other patrons
tural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, Proposed Rule for Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities; Architectural Barriers
Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines, 64 Fed Reg 62248, 62278 (1999) (amending 36 CFR Parts
1190-91). In January 2001, the Justice Department and United Artists Theatre Circuit (a major
theater owner) entered a settlement agreement requiring wheelchair placements to have vertical
viewing angles from the fiftieth percentile to the hundredth percentile of vertical viewing angles
of all seats. See Joint Stipulation for Amendment of Settlement Order and Granting Injunctive
Relief Dated August 14, 1996, Arnold v United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc, No C 93 0079 TEH
(ND Cal filed Jan 17,2001), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/uaamend.htm (visited May 15,
2004).
25 28 CFR Part 36, Appendix A § 4.33.3.
26 Justice Department Hoyts Brief at *45 (cited in note 7) (arguing that the term "integral"
justifies this interpretation).
27 Id at *49-57. The Justice Department contends that the requirement of comparable
viewing angles for wheelchair seats is clear from the language of Standard 4.33.3 and thus must
be applied to all theaters built after 1991. See the discussion of the Justice Department's notice
argument in Part III.B.
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and provides a better viewing angle to the screen, giving moviegoers a
more direct view of the screen than traditional movie theaters.2 As de-
signs evolved, theaters adopted different seating configurations.
Older stadium-style theaters contain both stadium-style and
"traditional" seating (located on a sloped floor or less dramatically
tiered risers). The traditional seating is invariably placed in the very
front of the theater, with the stadium-style seating occupying the ma-
jority of the auditorium (on average, more than 70 percent). '9 The two
different types of seating are separated by an access aisle that pro-
vides the means of ingress and egress from the theater. These older
stadium-style theaters place the wheelchair accessible seating in the
front rows, relegating wheelchair users to an inferior viewing experi-
ence because of the steep viewing angles from these rows. This ar-
rangement also isolates wheelchair users in a section of the theater
that no able-bodied patron would choose to sit in unless accompany-
ing a wheelchair user or unable to find a more desirable seat."o
Many newer stadium-style theaters provide better options for
wheelchair users. Some provide elevator access to the stadium-style
section of the theater, while in others the access aisle intersects an up-
per and lower section of stadium-style seating, allowing wheelchair
placements in the top tier of the lower section of stadium seating."
Under the Justice Department's interpretation, these theaters comply
with the requisites of the ADA because they provide wheelchair seat-
ing options with viewing angles comparable to those of the general
seating.
28 This factual overview is drawn in large part from the excellent description of the history
and configuration of stadium-style theaters provided by the court in United States v Hoyts Cine-
mas Corp, 256 F Supp 2d 73,78-80 (D Mass 2003).
29 Id at 78-79.
30 See Justice Department Hoyts Brief at *19 (cited in note 7) (finding through seat-
selection surveys that 99.7 percent of moviegoers chose to sit in the stadium-style seats when
choosing a seat in an auditorium comprised of both stadium- and traditional-style seats). See also
AMC Entertainment, Inc, 232 F Supp 2d at 1103 (finding that "most members of the public can,
and do, sit in the stadium-style seats"). Some wheelchair seating in older stadium-style theaters is
placed in the access aisle itself£ providing more desirable viewing angles than the front rows, but
still inferior to the seats in the stadium-style section. See Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 79-80.
31 See Proof Brief for the United States as Appellant, United States v Cinemark USA, Inc,
Civil Action No 02-3100, *5-6 (6th Cir filed Mar 18,2002) (Justice Department Cinemark Brief)
(describing Cinemark's newer, wheelchair-friendly stadium seating areas); Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging Reversal, Oregon Paralyzed Veterans
of America v Regal Cinemas, Civil Action No 01-35554, *7 n 5 (9th Cir filed Oct 19,2001) (Justice
Department Regal Brief) (relating the Justice Department's findings in enforcing Title III that
some newer theaters provide more desirable wheelchair seating through the above-mentioned
designs).
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II. CIRCUIT SPLIT MAJORITY AND MINORITY VIEWS
The Justice Department's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 has
developed almost entirely through litigation; besides the initial Stan-
dards, the Justice Department has not undertaken to clarify this area
of law through notice and comment rulemaking. As a result, the law in
this area is murky, as evidenced by the current circuit split. One line of
cases rejects the ADA challenge, declining to adopt the Justice De-
partment's current interpretation of the Standard because the Access
Board has not yet adopted this interpretation in its regulations, and
instead finds that Standard 4.33.3 requires merely unobstructed views.
Another line of cases accepts the Justice Department's contention
that stadium-style theaters violate the ADA, finding that the Justice
Department's interpretation of its own regulation warrants judicial
deference, and rejecting the contention that this interpretation consti-
tutes a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) notice
and comment requirement. These courts further disagree about
whether wheelchair placements in older stadium-style theaters are so
isolated as to violate the Standard's requirement that wheelchair
placements be integrated in the general seating plan, and what, if any,
retroactive effect should be given to the interpretation.
In Lara v Cinemark USA, Inc,32 the first major decision address-
ing the application of Standard 4.33.3 to stadium-style theaters, the
Fifth Circuit held that the comparable-line-of-sight requirement of
Standard 4.33.3 requires only that wheelchair patrons be afforded an
unobstructed view of the screen, and does not require that wheelchair
users be afforded a viewing angle comparable with other patrons',
thus interpreting "line of sight comparable" to require that wheelchair
and general seating be comparably unobstructed. 3 Under this inter-
pretation, placing wheelchair seating in the front rows of stadium-style
theaters, where viewing angles are inferior to those afforded to the
general public, does not violate the ADA.3
32 207 F3d 783 (5th Cir 2000).
33 Id at 789.
34 The theaters do not contest the Justice Department's and individual plaintiffs' conten-
tion that wheelchair seating located in the front of theaters provides inferior viewing angles to
those afforded to patrons who are able to sit in the stadium-style seats. The conflict in these cases
is focused not on the quality of the wheelchair users' experience but rather on the legal require-
ments imposed by the Standards. This style of theater has been heavily advertised by the theater
chains as providing a far superior cinematic experience to traditional style theaters. United States
v Hoyts Cinemas Corp, 256 F Supp 2d 73,79 n 6 (D Mass 2003) (citations omitted):
National Amusements has stated in press releases touting its new stadium theaters that sta-
dium-style seating is "one of the greatest advances in moviegoing in years" and that it "op-
timizes sight lines to the screen" and makes "every seat" the "best in the house." Hoyts has
issued similar press releases extolling the virtues of stadium seating. According to Hoyts,
stadium-style seating "[e]nsures moviegoers the ultimate cinematic experience" and guar-
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More recent cases have rejected the Lara interpretation, how-
ever, finding that stadium-style theaters must provide wheelchair seats
with viewing angles comparable to those in the general seating. In
United States v Hoyts Cinemas Corp,3 the District of Massachusetts
held that placing wheelchair seating in the traditional seating section
of the theater not only violates the viewing-angle requirement of
Standard 4.33.3, but also its integrality provision.3 In Oregon Para-
lyzed Veterans of America v Regal Cinemas, Inc," the Ninth Circuit ex-
panded on Hoyts, rejecting the Lara court's reasoning, and holding
that the "comparable" language in Standard 4.33.3 requires that view-
ing angles be "within the range of angles offered to the general pub-
lic" in stadium-style theaters." Most recently, in United States v Cine-
mark USA, Inc," the Sixth Circuit similarly rejected the Lara argu-
ment and found that "the plain meaning of 'lines of sight comparable
to those for members of the general public' requires more points of
similarity than merely an unobstructed view." None of the cases ac-
cepting the Justice Department's argument expressly approve retroac-
tive application of the interpretation, however, and two counsel
strongly against it."
These cases indicate a trend toward finding "comparable lines of
sight" to require comparability of viewing angles.42 Both the majority
(viewing angles must be comparable) and minority (lines of sight must
be comparably unobstructed) views raise several issues, the most im-
portant of which is the weight given to the Justice Department's inter-
pretation of the Standards. The majority view affords it deferential
weight, while the minority view finds it both unsupported and contra-
dicted by past precedent. Other issues considered include the re-
quirement of "integrality" for seats allocated to wheelchair users, the
antees all patrons "the best seat in the house" because "[glone are the days of craning your
neck to see the screen."
These statements imply (if they do not expressly state) that stadium-style seats are far better
than (and thus not comparable to) traditional seating. For the purposes of this Comment, the fact
that wheelchair users in the older stadium-style theaters are afforded inferior viewing angles is
assumed.
35 256 F Supp 2d 73 (D Mass 2003).
36 Id at 86.
37 339 F3d 1126 (9th Cir 2003), cert denied as Regal Cinemas Inc v Stewmon, 72 USLW
3310 (2004).
38 Id at 1133.
39 348 F3d 569 (6th Cir 2003), cert denied, 72 USLW 3513 (2004).
40 Idat578.
41 See id at 581; Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 92-93.
42 See also United States v AMC Entertainment, Inc, 232 F Supp 2d 1092, 1113 (CD Cal
2002) (finding that current stadium-style configurations violate the ADA). But see Meineker v
Hoyts Cinemas Corp, 69 Fed Appx 19,22-25 (2d Cir 2003), reversing 216 F Supp 2d 14 (ND NY
2002) (remanding the case to the district court for determination of whether the Justice Depart-
ment is entitled to deference to its interpretation).
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strictures of the notice and comment rulemaking process under the
APA, the import of an Access Board proposed rulemaking, and the
import of cases considering the Standards as applied to athletic
arenas.
A. Majority View: Deference to the Justice Department's
Interpretation, Integration Concerns, and APA Compliance
1. Deference to the Justice Department's interpretation.
The first and most important issue in these cases is whether the
Justice Department's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 is entitled to
deference from the courts. Agency interpretations of their own regula-
tions are afforded deference unless "plainly erroneous or inconsis-
tent" with the regulation; therefore only an interpretation that is in-
consistent with the language of the Standard may be overruled.4 ' The
deference afforded to agency interpretations of their own regulations
may be even greater than that afforded to agency interpretations of
statutes: because the agency itself drafts the regulation, its interpreta-
tion is considered even more authoritative."
Both circuits that have ruled on the question of deference to the
Justice Department's viewing-angle interpretation of Standard 4.33.3
have found that it is entitled to deference. The Fifth Circuit, the lone
appellate court adhering to the minority view, did not consider
whether deference was due to the Justice Department's interpretation,
and the Second Circuit remanded a case, instructing the district court
43 Thomas Jefferson University v Shalala, 512 US 504, 512 (1994) ("We must give substan-
tial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. Our task is not to decide
which among several competing interpretations best serves the regulatory purpose. Rather, the
agency's interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or incon-
sistent with the regulation.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Bowles v Seminole
Rock & Sand Co, 325 US 410, 414 (1945) (holding that "the ultimate criterion [for choosing be-
tween constructions of a regulation] is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of con-
trolling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation").
44 The standard of agency deference was articulated in Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 842-43 (1984), where the Court set forth a two-part
test establishing deference to agency interpretations of statutes on the rationale that Congress
delegates interpretive authority to agencies. A case interpreting Standard 4.33.3 in another con-
text indicated that agency interpretations of their own regulations may warrant even more def-
erence from the courts, as Congress delegates not only interpretive but also drafting authority to
agencies vis-A-vis their own regulations. See Paralyzed Veterans ofAmerica v DCArena, LP, 117
F3d 579, 584 (DC Cir 1997) ("It is sometimes said that this deference is even greater than that
granted an agency interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to administer."). This deferential
standard was most recently affirmed by the Court in Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452, 461 (1997)
("Because the [provision at issue] is a creature of the Secretary's own regulations, his interpreta-
tion of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
45 See Cinemark, 348 F3d at 579 ("The DOJ position in this case is neither plainly errone-
ous nor inconsistent with the regulation."); Regal, 339 F3d at 1131-33.
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to consider the deference question.9 The Ninth and Sixth Circuits
found the deference issue dispositive in determining that the Justice
Department should prevail.
2. Integrality requirement.
Courts addressing this issue have also considered whether placing
wheelchair seating in the front rows of the theaters violates the inte-
grality requirement of Standard 4.33.347 This challenge to stadium-
style theaters was most recently posed in the First Circuit, where the
Justice Department argued that by placing wheelchair seats in an area
of the auditorium where able-bodied patrons sit reluctantly and infre-
quently, the layout of older stadium-style theaters effectively isolates
wheelchair users,thus violating the requirement that "[w]heelchair ar-
eas shall be an integral part of any fixed seating plan."' The wheel-
chair seats are among at least some general public seating; however,
few members of the general public voluntarily choose those seats.
Thus, the Justice Department contends, this layout isolates wheelchair
users and denies them the full enjoyment of public accommodations."
No appellate court has ruled on the integrality argument9 The
Hoyts court, however, found that placing wheelchair seating in the
very front of stadium-style theaters, "where no-one would sit will-
ingly," violates this portion of the regulation:' "Common sense dic-
tates [ ] that seating located in a totally separate, and ofttimes sec-
tioned-off, area in the front of the theater cannot be an 'integral' part
of that [theater's] 'fixed seating plan.' 52
46 See Lara, 207 F3d at 786-89; Meineker, 69 Fed Appx at 22-25.
47 28 CFR Part 36, Appendix A § 4.33.3 ("Wheelchair areas shall be an integral part of any
fixed seating plan.").
48 Id.
49 See Justice Department Hoyts Brief at *19-20 (cited in note 7). The theater owners ar-
gue that such wheelchair seating cannot violate the integrality requirement because it is placed
among general public seating. But this argument is dubious: Standard 4.33.3's companion-seating
provision requires theater owners to place wheelchair seats next to "at least one companion
fixed seat" for wheelchair users' able-bodied companions. See 28 CFR Part 36, Appendix A
§ 4.33.3 ("At least one companion fixed seat shall be provided next to each wheelchair seating
area.") (emphasis removed). A wheelchair seating placement does not become integrated by vir-
tue of having one non-wheelchair companion seat placed next to it as required by law. If the two
seats (wheelchair and companion) are isolated and segregated from the rest of the seating plan,
the wheelchair seat placement is no more integrated when it is accompanied by a companion
seat than it is on its own.
50 The Sixth Circuit in Cinemark, 348 F3d 569, did not rule on the question of whether the
wheelchair placement violated the integrality requirement of Standard 4.33.3, although the Jus-
tice Department raised the issue in its appellate brief. See Justice Department Cinemark Brief at
*8 (cited in note 31).
51 Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 89.
52 Id.
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3. APA compliance.
Some courts have also considered whether giving force to the Jus-
tice Department's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 violates the APA
requirement that substantive regulations be subject to public notice
and comment prior to becoming binding law. Notice and comment is
not, however, required for interpretive agency actions," and the Justice
Department argues that its interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 falls into
this category. APA considerations have been largely rejected or ig-
nored in the context of stadium-style seating in movie theaters," but
warrant examination nonetheless.5
B. Minority View: Access Board Rulemaking and Athletic
Arena Cases
At the time of this writing, two circuits have adopted the Justice
Department's interpretation of the Standard as controlling and sensi-
ble, 6 and another indicated that so long as the Justice Department's
interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 was reasonable, a district court on
remand should adopt the viewing-angle requirement as well. 7 The
Lara decision, in contrast, rejected the Justice Department's interpre-
tation on two grounds: first, the Justice Department's interpretation of
Standard 4.33.3 has not yet been incorporated by the Access Board
into the ADAAG, requiring the court to reject this interpretation "in
the absence of specific regulatory guidance";M and second, prior litiga-
53 APA, 5 USC § 553(b)-(c) (2000) ("General notice of proposed rule making shall be
published in the Federal Register.... [Tihe agency shall [then] give interested persons an oppor-
tunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or argu-
ments."). An agency is not required to follow notice and comment procedures when it makes "in-
terpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice," or when "the agency for good cause finds ... that notice and public procedure thereon
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest," except when required by stat-
ute. Id.
54 See Cinemark, 348 F3d at 580-81 & n 8 (rejecting an APA challenge because the Justice
Department's position falls into the interpretive rule exception); Regal, 339 F3d at 1130-33 (not
considering any APA challenge).
55 It is not clear why APA considerations are absent from the stadium-style theater cases:
the Justice Department's failure to undertake notice and comment rulemaking was fatal to its
challenge of wheelchair seating in athletic arenas in two of the three major cases. See Caruso v
Blockbuster-Sony Entertainment Centre at the Waterfront, 193 F3d 730,731-37 (3d Cir 1999); In-
dependent Living Resources v Oregon Arena Corp, 982 F Supp 698, 743 (D Or 1997). Theaters
have challenged the Justice Department's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 on APA grounds.
See, for example, Brief for Appellees Regal Cinemas, Inc and Eastgate Theater, Inc, Oregon
Paralyzed Veterans v Regal Cinemas Inc, Civil Action No 01-35554, *34-37 (filed Apr 13, 2002)
(available on Westlaw at 2002 WL 32154039). They continue to do so. See Cinemark Petition
(cited in note 13) (raising, among other things, an APA challenge to the Justice Department's in-
terpretation of Standard 4.33.3).
56 See Cinemark, 348 F3d at 575-79; Regal, 339 F3d at 1131-33.
57 Meineker, 69 Fed Appx at 22-25.
58 Lara, 207 F3d at 789.
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tion concerning Standard 4.33.3's application to athletic arenas de-
fined comparable lines of sight as requiring unobstructed views, and
the same definition should apply to stadium-style theaters.
1. The Access Board's notice of proposed regulation.
The Lara decision made much of a Notice of Proposed Regula-
tion submitted by the Access Board in 1999,59 in which the Board con-
templates amending the ADAAG to clarify that viewing angle is an
element of comparability of lines of sight. ° The proposed regulation
notes that stadium-style theaters afford wheelchair users "inferior
lines of sight to the screen," and requests feedback from wheelchair
users and theater owners on a proposed modification that would bring
the language of ADAAG § 4.33.3 in step with the Justice Depart-
ment's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3:1
[The] DOJ has asserted in attempting to settle particular cases
that wheelchair seating locations must: (1) Be placed within the
stadium-style section of the theater, rather than on a sloped floor
or other area within the auditorium where tiers or risers have not
been used to improve viewing angles; (2) provide viewing angles
that are equivalent to or better than the viewing angles (includ-
ing vertical, horizontal, and angle to the top of screen) provided
by 50 percent of the seats in the auditorium, counting all seats of
any type sold in that auditorium; and (3) provide a view of the
screen, in terms of lack of obstruction (e.g., a clear view over the
heads of other patrons), that is in the top 50 percent of all seats
of any type sold in the auditorium. The Board is considering
whether to include specific requirements in the final rule that are
consistent with DOJ's interpretation of 4.33.3 to stadium-style
movie theaters.6
The Lara court found this Access Board proposal dispositive in
deciding that "lines of sight comparable" need not include
comparability of viewing angles.6 The court determined that the Ac-
cess Board would amend its regulations through appropriate means if
the Justice Department's understanding was indeed a valid interpreta-
tion of the language.6' This Notice of Proposed Regulation, the court
59 Id at 788-89.
60 See 64 Fed Reg at 62277-78 (cited in note 24). The Access Board issued the final version
of this regulation on January 14, 2004. The text of the final regulation will not be available until
the Office of Management and Budget approves the regulation.
61 Id at 62278.
62 Id.
63 Lara, 207 F3d at 789.
64 Id.
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concluded, indicated that the Access Board had not yet decided
whether to adopt the Justice Department's interpretation of Standard
4.33.3, and until such time, the Justice Department's interpretation is• 65
not controlling.
2. Athletic arena cases.
The Lara decision also relied on the athletic arena cases, which
considered whether Standard 4.33.3 requires that wheelchair users be
provided lines of sight over standing spectators, and also ended in a
stalemate circuit split.6 Two of these cases declined to adopt the Jus-
tice Department's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3, finding that its in-
terpretation (that "comparability" requires wheelchair seat place-
ments such that views remain unobstructed even when other specta-
tors stand) was too radical to be considered an "interpretive" rule for
the purposes of APA compliance. 6' Deference to the Justice Depart-
ment's interpretation of its own regulation was not considered. The
D.C. Circuit, in finding that lines of sight over standing spectators are
required, based its decision on purposive grounds, reading Standard
4.33.3 with the broad purposes of the ADA in mind.6 This decision,
while holding that the Standard requires that wheelchair users have
lines of sight over standing spectators, required only substantial com-
pliance (that is, if "substantially all" of the wheelchair seating provides
lines of sight over standing spectators, the ADA requirements are
met). 69
The Lara court relied upon these cases to interpret the "lines of
sight comparable" language as requiring that wheelchair users in sta-
dium-style theaters be provided unobstructed views of the screen,
rather than viewing angles comparable with those provided to mem-
65 See id (internal citations omitted):
To impose a viewing angle requirement at this juncture would require district courts to in-
terpret the ADA based upon the subjective and undoubtedly diverse preferences of dis-
abled moviegoers. Congress granted the DOJ, in conjunction with the Access Board, the au-
thority to promulgate regulations under the ADA in order to provide ... clear guidelines
for accommodating disabled patrons. Accordingly, in the absence of specific regulatory
guidance, we must hold that section 4.33.3 does not require movie theaters to provide dis-
abled patrons with the same viewing angles available to the majority of non-disabled
patrons.
66 Compare DC Arena, 117 F3d at 588 (requiring sightlines over standing spectators), with
Caruso, 193 F3d at 735-37 (declining to require sightlines over standing spectators on APA no-
tice and comment grounds).
67 Caruso, 193 F3d at 735-37; Independent Living Resources, 982 F Supp at 743.
68 See DCArena, 117 F3d at 583.
69 Id at 589. The court required only substantial compliance because of the "hazy" posi-
tions of the Justice Department and the good faith of the stadium designers. Id at 582. See the
discussion of the impact of the government's failure to codify its position on this matter in
Part III.C.
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bers of the general public.0 The court also found persuasive a Techni-
cal Assistance Manual Supplement (TAM) published by the Justice
Department in 1994, which required "lines of sight over spectators
who stand" and did not mention viewing angles,7' in coming to its con-
clusion that the Standard requires unobstructed views and no more.
III. RESOLUTION OF THE SPLIT: THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S
CONTROLLING INTERPRETATION, RETROACTIVE EFFECT,
AND ABDICATION OF RULEMAKING ROLE
The Justice Department should prevail in the courts and, ulti-
mately, in its quest to eradicate the more egregious disparities be-
tween wheelchair users and the general public in stadium-style thea-
ters. Principles of agency deference, as well as the strength of the Jus-
tice Department's arguments vis-A-vis the minority view, dictate that,
one way or the other, comparable lines of sight will encompass view-
ing angles in stadium-style theaters. Questions remain as to whether
retroactive effect can or should be given to this interpretation (requir-
ing retrofitting of existing noncompliant theaters), and if so, for what
group of theaters retroactive effect is warranted. Finally, and most im-
portantly, the progression of these cases raises questions about the
Justice Department's piecemeal approach to resolving the confusion
in Standard 4.33.3, and demonstrates why courts must discourage
this method of enforcement and encourage notice and comment
rulemaking.
A. Stadium-Style Theaters Must Provide Comparable Viewing
Angles for Disabled Patrons
Standard 4.33.3 requires stadium-style theaters to provide wheel-
chair seating that affords viewing angles comparable to those of the
general seating. This conclusion is mandated by the strong principle of
agency deference articulated by courts accepting the Justice Depart-
ment's interpretation, as well as a recognition that the arguments lev-
ied against this interpretation (posed by theater companies and ac-
cepted by the Fifth Circuit in Lara) are erroneous. This means that
placing wheelchair seating in the front rows of a stadium-style theater,
where the viewing angles are inferior, violates the Standard and, ac-
cordingly, the ADA.
70 Lara, 207 F3d at 788.
71 Id (quoting the TAM).
2004] 1123
The University of Chicago Law Review
1. Deference to the Justice Department's interpretation.
The Justice Department's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3, that
wheelchair seating must provide viewing angles comparable to the
general seating, is entitled to deference because it is neither "plainly
erroneous [n]or inconsistent with the regulation."7 The Access Board
characterized this position as requiring wheelchair seats to have view-
ing angles "equivalent to or better than the viewing angles ... pro-
vided by 50 percent of seats."73 This interpretation stretches neither the
plain language nor the apparent purpose of the regulation, and as such
is entitled to deference." Indeed, as noted by both the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits, the Justice Department's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3
controls both on principles of agency deference and because it is most
consistent with the plain import of the regulation.5
Deference would not be appropriate to an agency's "convenient
litigating position"; post hoc justifications adopted by an agency for
the purposes of a particular case or cases are not the product of the
"fair and considered judgment" 6 that underlies the agency deference
principle. However, the fact that this interpretation has been posited
in the context of litigation does not make the Justice Department's in-
terpretation of Standard 4.33.3 entitled to any less deference. The D.C.
Circuit presents the following formula for deferring to agency inter-
pretations of their own regulations:
There are at least three preconditions for applying [this] defer-
ence. First, the language of the regulation in question must be
ambiguous, lest a substantively new rule be promulgated under
the guise of interpretation. Second, there must be no reason to
72 Thomas Jefferson University v Shalala, 512 US 504, 512 (1994), quoting Bowles v Semi-
nole Rock & Sand Co, 325 US 410,414 (1945) (internal citations omitted).
73 64 Fed Reg at 62278 (cited in note 24). The "better" language begs the question of who
decides what constitutes a better viewing angle, and what entity is best equipped to determine
this. See discussion in Part III.C.
74 The Justice Department in its appellate briefs on this matter demonstrates that "lines of
sight" is a term of art in the theater design industry, and encompasses viewing angles. See gener-
ally Justice Department Hoyts Brief (cited in note 7) (citing various theater industry documents
and reports that contend that optimal vertical viewing angles are vastly exceeded by the vertical
viewing angles that the wheelchair seating in the older stadium-style theaters provides).
75 See Cinemark, 348 F3d at 576 (finding that adopting the Justice Department's interpre-
tation "furthers the central goals of Title III of the ADA"); Regal, 339 F3d at 1132-34.
76 Drake v FAA, 291 F3d 59, 68 (DC Cir 2002), quoting Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452, 462
(1997).
77 Auer, 519 US at 453 (deferring to an agency interpretation that was put forth in an
amicus brief because it was not "a position adopted in response to litigation"). See also Bowen v
Georgetown University Hospital, 488 US 204,212-13 (1988) (declining, on the ground that Con-
gress delegated interpretation and enforcement power to the agency rather than appellate coun-
sel, to give deference to an agency attorney's interpretation of a statute when the agency itself
had articulated no position on the question).
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suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair
and considered judgment on the matter in question. Finally, the
agency's reading of its regulation must be fairly supported by the
text of the regulation itself, so as to ensure that adequate notice
of that interpretation is contained within the rule itself.8
The "lines of sight comparable" language of Standard 4.33.3 is
unquestionably ambiguous: the Justice Department itself construes
the language in at least two different ways." Further, the theaters have
not been successful in characterizing the Justice Department's inter-
pretation as anything but a "fair and considered judgment": the thea-
ters contest the medium through which the Justice Department has
asserted this interpretation, but cannot demonstrate that the sub-
stance of the interpretation is specious." Finally, the theater industry
adopts the reading of "lines of sight" as encompassing viewing angles
in its own design specifications," definitively proving that this interpre-
tation "is contained within the rule itself." Thus, deference to the Jus-
tice Department's interpretation is appropriate.
2. Integrality concerns.
It is less clear that Standard 4.33.3's integrality requirement,
which requires that wheelchair seating be incorporated with general
seating, applies with equal force. Unlike the term "lines of sight," the
proposition that relegating wheelchair users to the front of the audito-
rium violates the integrality requirement is not self-evident from in-
dustry standards and publications, but rather is a recent creature of
the Justice Department's own interpretation." This does not fully dis-
credit the integrality argument-the Justice Department's interpreta-
tion is entitled to deference unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation, ' "" and presenting an interpretation for the first
time in an amicus brief is not ipso facto illegitimate."' It does, however,
78 Drake, 291 F3d at 68 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (giving deference
to the Federal Aviation Administration's interpretation of a regulation regarding disclosure of
drug-testing information).
79 Compare Paralyzed Veterans of America v DC Arena, LP, 117 F3d 579, 583 (DC Cir
1997) (construing the Standard to require unobstructed views), with Cinemark, 348 F3d at 576
(construing the Standard to require comparable viewing angles).
80 The theater industry design specifications adopt an understanding of "lines of sight" as
encompassing viewing angles, indicating that the Justice Department's interpretation is reason-
able. See Justice Department Hoyts Brief at *9-15 (cited in note 7).
81 Id.
82 See id at *54 & n 14 (cited in note 7) (asserting that wheelchair seating violates the inte-
grality requirement as of July 1998, upon filing of the amicus brief in the Lara district court case).
See also id at *45 n 11 (explaining that the United States does not intend to raise the integrality
issue for auditoriums constructed prior to 1998).
83 Auer, 519 US at 461.
84 Id at 462-63 (accepting an interpretation presented by an agency in an amicus brief).
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lend credence to the theater companies' argument, at least with regard
to the integrality provision, that the Justice Department is attempting
to gain judicial deference to a "convenient litigating position" rather
than to a "fair and considered" agency determination.'
The language of Standard 4.33.3 may also defeat the
government's integrality argument. The Standard creates an exception
to the integrality requirement, allowing for "clustering" of wheelchair
seat placements in "bleachers, balconies, and other areas having sight
lines that require slopes of greater than 5 percent."'6 This exception
was designed for seating areas that are high above the spectacle being
observed and typically only accessible by steps, and allows public ac-
commodations to provide wheelchair seating without "fundamentally
alter[ing] the nature" of their facilities.o
The clustering exception is inapplicable to a traditional single-
level movie theater." Stadium-style theaters, however, have both lines
of sight far in excess of 5 percent (degrees above or below horizontal)
and access to seats via steps rather than ramps." In Lara, the court in-
dicated that the clustering exception was applicable to stadium-style
theaters, but noted that it does not exempt theaters from the compa-
rable-line-of-sight requirement." Even if stadium-style auditoriums
need not comply with the integrality requirement of Standard 4.33.3
because of the clustering exception, the comparability requirement
nonetheless prevents theaters from locating all wheelchair seating in
See also Part III.B.
85 Bowen, 488 US at 212-13.
86 28 CFR Part 36, Appendix A § 4.33.3 (emphasis removed).
87 42 USC § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
88 See Fiedler v American Multi-Cinema, Inc, 871 F Supp 35, 38-39 (D DC 1994) (holding
that the clustering exception does not allow the defendant to locate wheelchair placements
solely in the back of the theater, but denying relief to the wheelchair user on other grounds).
89 See Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 78.
90 See Lara, 207 F3d at 787 & n 3 (indicating that the 5 percent slope exception permits
clustering of wheelchair seating in stadium-style theaters, but that theaters must still comply with
the comparable-line-of-sight requirement). But see Caruso v Blockbuster-Sony Music Enter-
tainment Centre, 968 F Supp 210, 219 n 21 (D NJ 1997), revd on other grounds, 193 F3d 730 (3d
Cir 1999) (reading the 5 percent slope exception of 4.33.3 as "somewhat confusing" but finding
that it "allow[s] clustering of wheelchair seats within a sloped area on the levels that have acces-
sible egress"). The clustering exception in Standard 4.33.3 may be removed from the regula-
tion-the Access Board's proposed new regulations remove it. See 64 Fed Reg at 62276 (cited in
note 24) ("As recommended by the advisory committee, the exception in ADAAG 4.33.3, that
permits wheelchair spaces to be clustered in seating areas with sight lines that require slopes
greater than 5 %, has been removed."). The final version of these new regulations was approved
by the Access Board on January 14, 2004, but will not be publicly available until the Office of
Management and Budget has approved the regulations. See http://www.access-board.gov/ada-
aba/status.htm (visited May 15, 2004). Even once the ADAAG update is finalized, however, the
Justice Department's Standards are still separate and legally binding. If the clustering exception
is to be removed from the Standards, the Justice Department will need to formally amend them.
For a discussion of the relationship between the ADAAG and Standards, see Part III.A.4.
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the front rows, on comparability of viewing angles rather than inte-
grality grounds."
3. APA compliance.
Although the APA has not played a major role in the courts' de-
cisions, theaters continue to argue that the Justice Department's inter-
pretation of Standard 4.33.3 violates the notice and comment re-
quirement.2 In cases considering sightlines over standing spectators in
athletic arenas, several courts ruled that the Justice Department's in-
terpretation did not comply with the APA. 3 These cases relied upon
the fact that the Justice Department's interpretation of Standard
4.33.3 contradicted the intent of the Access Board in promulgating the
regulation because the Access Board intended to leave unresolved the
question of whether the Standard required sightlines over standing
spectators." This logic dictates that APA notice and comment re-
quirements should be followed when an agency issues a new interpre-
tation of a regulation that "repudiates or substantially departs from
the agency's previous interpretation.
In contrast, in the context of stadium-style theaters, the Justice
Department's interpretation of "lines of sight comparable" as requir-
ing comparability of viewing angles is not a substantial departure from
a previous interpretation or understanding: there is no previous inter-
pretation. Unlike the question of sightlines over standing spectators,
and as noted by the Lara court, stadium-style theaters and the accom-
panying line-of-sight controversy were not at issue in 1991 when the
91 But see Note, 117 Harv L Rev at 730-33 (cited in note 17) (summarizing the Regal deci-
sion and arguing that the integrality requirement should be used in lieu of comparable viewing
angles to effect equality for wheelchair patrons in stadium-style theaters). Conceivably, if sta-
dium-style theaters fall within the clustering exception to Standard 4.33.3, theaters could con-
struct separate viewing platforms for wheelchair users and their companions so long as they pro-
vide comparable viewing angles. However, in light of the newer stadium-style theaters that both
integrate wheelchair seating and provide comparable viewing angles, and the likelihood that cre-
ating such a "wheelchair ghetto" would entail more expense than integrating wheelchair seating
into the stadium-style section (meaning that the theater companies would only create such an in-
tegrality violation out of animus for wheelchair users), such an argument seems fanciful.
92 See generally Cinemark Petition (cited in note 13).
93 See Caruso, 193 F3d at 731-37 (holding that a music venue did not have to guarantee
sightlines over standing spectators because of failure to follow APA notice and comment re-
quirements); Independent Living Resources v Oregon Arena Corp, 982 F Supp 698, 743 (D Or
1997) ("If the Access Board wishes to revise its interpretation of ADAAG 4.33.3 to include a re-
quirement for lines of sight over standing spectators, it will have to do so through notice and
comment rulemaking."). See also the discussion of athletic arena cases in Part III.A.5.
94 See Caruso, 193 F3d at 735-36, citing Thomas Jefferson University, 512 US at 512 (find-
ing that the court should not defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation if an "al-
ternative reading is compelled by ... indications of the [agency's] intent at the time of the regula-
tion's promulgation").
95 Independent Living Resources, 982 F Supp at 737. See also Caruso, 193 F3d at 735-36.
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Standards were promulgated. The Justice Department's interpretation
is just that, an interpretation, the quintessential exception to the APA
notice and comment requirement.
In a case finding that the Justice Department's interpretation of
Standard 4.33.3 as requiring lines of sight over standing spectators did
not violate the APA, one court noted that "there was no uniformly
understood construction of the language [of Standard 4.33.3] prior to
the time it was picked up by the [Access] Board and the [Justice] De-
partment."" Thus the "new" interpretation did not contradict previous
understandings and therefore need not go through the APA notice
and comment process.9 This logic applies with even greater force in
the stadium-style theater context: unlike lines of sight over standing
spectators, where courts disagree about the understanding of the
Standard in 1991, there is no question that sightlines in stadium-style
theaters were not addressed in 1991. If anything, the Justice Depart-
ment's interpretation is consistent with the understanding of "lines of
sight," a term of art in the theater industry that includes viewing angle.
Either way, this interpretation presents no conflict with the APA.
4. The Access Board's notice of proposed regulation.
The argument that the Access Board's notice of proposed rule-
making demonstrates that the Justice Department's interpretation is
inconsistent with the text of Standard 4.33.3 misconstrues the relation-
ship between the Access Board's ADAAG and the Justice Depart-
ment's Standards. The ADA expressly delegates to the Justice De-
partment the power and duty to promulgate regulations that will be
used to enforce and carry out the purposes of the statute." These regu-
lations must at minimum be consistent with the ADAAG,9 which the
Access Board was required to promulgate three months prior to the
Justice Department's deadline for promulgating its own regulations."®
Notably, while the Justice Department regulations must meet the
minimum standards of the ADAAG, nothing restricts it from pro-
pounding guidelines exceeding these minimum standards. It is irrele-
vant whether interpreting "lines of sight comparable" is within the
scope of the language as understood by the Access Board when it
promulgated the ADAAG. The Justice Department is entitled (and
statutorily empowered) to interpret this language to encompass com-
96 DCArena, 117 F3d at 583.
97 Id.
98 42 USC § 12186(b).
99 42 USC § 12186(c).
100 42 USC §§ 12186(b), 12204(a) (requiring the Attorney General to promulgate regula-
tions one year from the date of the ADA's enactment, and requiring the Access Board to do so
nine months from the date of the ADA's enactment).
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parable viewing angles. More importantly, it is the Justice Depart-
ment's regulations and interpretations thereof that are binding on the
theaters-not the Access Board's ADAAG. The Lara court's ap-
proach, finding the fact that the Access Board had not yet adopted the
Justice Department's interpretation fatal to the Justice Department's
argument, directly contradicts the regulatory scheme that the ADA
contemplates. It is the Justice Department's interpretation of the
ADA that controls, not the Access Board's.
In the athletic arena cases,'' the D.C. Circuit made this distinction
clear: "Once the Board's language was put out by the Department as
its own regulation, it became, as the statute contemplates, the Justice
Department's and only the Justice Department's responsibility."' °
Courts show deference to agency interpretations of their own regula-
tions not only because of the agency's perceived expertise in drafting
the regulation, but also in recognition of Congress's decision to dele-
gate lawmaking and interpretive authority to the agency (and in this
case, not to the Access Board). "[T]he doctrine of deference is based
primarily on the agency's statutory role as the sponsor of the regula-
tion, not necessarily on its drafting expertise.... Nothing prevent[s]
the Department from imposing a greater burden [than that imposed
by the Access Board] on those entities covered by its regulation."'0 3
When the Access Board issues its final rule addressing whether view-
ing angles are a component of comparable lines of sight in the
ADAAG, the Justice Department will have to revisit its own Stan-
dards if the amended language raises the minimum standard of accessi-
bility. The actual content of the ADAAG is only instructive as a base-
line for the Justice Department's Standards, and is not binding on the
public.'O'
5. Justice Department's previous gloss on Standard 4.33.3 in
athletic arena cases.
The final argument against adopting the Justice Department's in-
terpretation of Standard 4.33.3 is its previous interpretation of the
Standard to require unobstructed views (relied upon by the Lara
court). But comparability is necessarily a situational determination:
lines of sight must be similar as compared with other seating in that
fixed seating plan, not as compared with lines of sight in public ac-
101 See Parts II.B.2 and III.A.5.
102 DC Arena, 117 F3d at 585.
103 Id at 585, 587.
104 See Access Board, Proposed ADA and ABA Accessibility Guidelines: An Overview,
online at http://www.access-board.gov/ada-aba/ruleoverview.htm (visited May 15, 2004) ("The
Board's guidelines do not directly impact the public but instead serve as a baseline for enforce-
able standards (which do) issued by other Federal agencies.").
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commodations around the country. Even if the Justice Department's
interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 as requiring unobstructed views in
the context of athletic arenas is fundamentally at odds with its inter-
pretation of the Standard as requiring comparable viewing angles in
the context of stadium-style theaters (it is not clear that both
interpretations cannot apply), it is comparability to seating in the
theaters, and not athletic arenas, that matters.
The TAM relied upon by the Lara court was published before
stadium-style theater design became popular, and applies only to are-
nas where "spectators can be expected to stand ..... demonstrating that
it was issued to provide guidance in connection with the athletic arena
cases and is not instructive as to stadium-style theaters. More impor-
tantly, obstructions are not an issue in movie theaters, and the Lara
court's application of this definition to stadium-style theaters is ill-
considered. In the context of movie theaters, comparability of lines of
sight has little to do with obstruction of views and everything to do
with quality of views.'" The Lara reasoning, depending largely on the
athletic arena cases, is inapt as applied to stadium-style seating in
movie theaters-the problem is simply not the same.
6. Mootness.
Additionally, both logic and evidence indicate that, regardless of
the outcome of pending cases, going forward the question of the
proper interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 for stadium-style theaters will
be rendered moot. The Justice Department has demonstrated its
commitment to this issue by participating as an amicus in cases
brought by private litigants and by launching a coordinated enforce-
ment campaign, signaling to theater companies that, in the future, they
should design new construction and remodeling projects so as to avoid
further litigation. Regardless of the final resolution of this issue
(whether the Justice Department prevails in its litigation campaign or
revises the Standard through notice and comment rulemaking), new
theaters will be configured in a way that complies with the Justice De-
partment's interpretation. Further evidence of this mootness is the
fact that stadium-style theaters are now being designed consistent
105 Title III Technical Assistance Manual 1994 Supplement at 111-7.5180, online at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3up.html (visited May 15,2004).
106 Contrast athletic stadiums, where obstructed views-whether temporary (standing spec-
tators) or permanent (poles)-are a reality. Boston's Fenway Park and its famous obstructed-
view seats come to mind as an example of the prevalence of obstructions in athletic arenas and
stadiums
107 Indeed, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits accordingly indicated that the Lara reasoning was
flawed on this ground. See Cinemark, 348 F3d at 577 ("The arguments relied upon by the Fifth
Circuit in Lara are ... not persuasive."); Regal, 339 F3d at 1132 n 9 (finding the Lara court's rea-
soning "specious").
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with the Justice Department's interpretation of the requirements of
Standard 4.33.3 and the ADA, locating wheelchair seating in the midst
of the stadium section."
B. Retroactivity
The issue of whether any retroactive effect should be given to the
Justice Department's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 is one of due
process-if the theater companies had no way of knowing what Stan-
dard 4.33.3 requires in demanding comparability of viewing angles,
then it violates due process to mandate expensive retrofitting of the
noncompliant theaters."9 The Justice Department argues that its inter-
pretation was clear from the beginning because it is clear from the
text itself; theater companies, predictably, argue just the opposite. The
courts that have directly ruled on this issue largely indicate that no
retroactive effect should be given to the Justice Department's inter-
pretation of "lines of sight comparable" as requiring comparability of
viewing angles. '
The Sixth Circuit recommended that the district court, on re-
mand, grant relief only prospectively. "We do not go so far as to hold
that any relief must be prospective to comport with due process, but
note that, given the [ ] facts, prospective relief will often be most ap-
propriate...' Similar statements were made by the District of Massa-
108 See, for example, United States v AMC Entertainment, Inc, 232 F Supp 2d 1092, 1096 &
n 4 (CD Cal 2002) (noting that theater companies began constructing theater complexes with
"'full stadium' seating" in 2001).
109 See Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108 (1972) ("[W]e insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he
may act accordingly."); Rock of Ages Corp v Secretary of Labor, 170 F3d 148, 156 (2d Cir 1999)
(judging the adequacy of notice from the perspective of "a reasonably prudent person" who is
"familiar with the conditions the regulations are meant to address" and the underlying statutory
"objectives the regulations are meant to achieve"). The fact that "lines of sight" is a term of art
encompassing viewing angle, although insufficient on its own to demonstrate notice, is helpful in
that it demonstrates that requiring comparable viewing angles is a tenable interpretation of the
regulation as applied to theater companies who are familiar with the meaning of the phrase. See,
for example, Thomas Jefferson University, 512 US at 525 (Thomas dissenting) ("[A]gency rules
should be clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate notice concerning the
agency's understanding of the law."); Satellite Broadcasting Co v FCC, 824 F2d 1, 3 (DC Cir
1987) ("Traditional concepts of due process incorporated into administrative law preclude an
agency from penalizing a private party for violating a rule without first providing adequate no-
tice of the substance of the rule.").
it0 See Cinemark, 348 F3d at 581; Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 92-93.
III Cinemark, 348 F3d at 581. The court also indicated that the Justice Department had
made oral representations at argument that it would not require "gutting" of the theaters, but
rather "reasonable" "remedial" actions. Id at 582 & n 10. This would appear to be a tacit finding
that some retrofitting may be required, a view expressly rejected by the court in Hoyts. 256 F
Supp 2d at 93 (requiring wheelchair seating to be located within stadium sections for all theaters
built or refurbished "on or after the date upon which this lawsuit commenced").
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chusetts and the Second Circuit."2 These courts expressed exaspera-
tion with the Justice Department for articulating its position through
litigation rather than rulemaking, and for failing to codify that posi-
tion and thereby provide irrefutable notice to theater companies of
what the Standard requires.
For a regulated party to have notice of an agency's interpretation
of a regulation, objective considerations of the agency's statements
and communications of its position, coupled with subjective determi-
nations of what the party knew or understood about the regulation,
are instructive. "We thus ask whether 'by reviewing the regulations
and other public statements issued by the agency, a regulated party
acting in good faith would be able to identify, with ascertainable cer-
tainty, the standards with which the agency expects parties to con-form.'",13
An agency has provided adequate notice of its interpretation
when the noncompliant party demonstrates, through later compliance,
that it is able to understand its obligations."' In this context, theater
companies are discredited both because they were later able to com-
ply with the Justice Department's interpretation (of which they pur-
port to have had no notice) and because the companies made no rea-
sonable effort to comply with the Justice Department's articulated in-
terpretation when it was initially presented."' The theater companies,
upon the filing of the Justice Department's amicus brief in Lara in
July 1998, were on notice as to the Justice Department's interpreta-
tion, and soon thereafter learned of the agency's commitment to fur-
thering this interpretation through affirmative enforcement actions."6
112 See Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 92-93 (stating that the federal government's failure to act
quickly on the longstanding issue of stadium seating "argues strongly in favor of making the re-
lief.., prospective"); Meineker v Hoyts Cinemas Corp, 69 Fed Appx 19, 25 (2d Cir 2003) (sug-
gesting that retroactive relief would be appropriate only if Hoyts had reasonable notice of the
Justice Department's interpretation of the ADA regarding theater sight lines). In Regal, the
court did not advise the district court whether relief should or could be retroactive, but the dis-
sent intimated that the decision would be retroactive, though the district court would retain lee-
way to apply the decision prospectively only on remand. 339 F3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld dissenting).
113 Trinity Broadcasting of Florida, Inc v FCC, 211 F3d 618, 628 (DC Cir 2000), quoting
General Electric Co v EPA, 53 F3d 1324, 1329 (DC Cir 1995) (emphasis added).
114 21st Century Telesis Joint Venture v FCC, 318 F3d 192, 201-02 (DC Cir 2003) (holding
that a broadband licensee could not use the FCC's clerical error to avoid a payment rule it had
successfully complied with for more than a year).
115 Id at 202. Indeed, the theater companies' actions evidence far more bad faith than good.
Many theaters continued to be built in the older configuration, relegating wheelchair users to the
front rows up until May 2002, see Justice Department Hoyts Brief at Schedule B (cited in note 7)
(listing theaters not in compliance with the Justice Department interpretation that were built af-
ter the amicus brief was filed with the Lara district court in 1998), while clearly the technology
and wherewithal existed to build auditoriums with wheelchair seating in the stadium sections.
See, for example, AMC Entertainment, 232 F Supp 2d at 1096 & n 4 (noting that theater compa-
nies began constructing theater complexes with "full stadium seating" in 2001).
116 See Justice Department Hoyts Brief at *54-55 (cited in note 7) (noting that Justice De-
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Moreover, between 1998 and 2000, the only decision concerning
stadium-style theaters was the Lara district court decision, finding that
the older configuration violated the ADA. Even after Lara's reversal
in the Fifth Circuit, the Justice Department continued to press its
argument in other circuits."' The Justice Department asserts several
arguments to demonstrate that theaters had adequate notice of its
interpretation, the most convincing of which illustrate that theaters
were aware of, but chose to ignore, the Justice Department's
interpretation.""
The Justice Department first argues that Standard 4.33.3 itself
provides notice of the requirements for placement of wheelchair seat-
ing in stadium-style theaters, because "lines of sight" is a term of art in
the theater industry that encompasses viewing angles."9 If this is true,
then in 1991, at the time Standard 4.33.3 was promulgated, theater
companies were well aware that "comparable lines of sight" meant
comparable viewing angles.' ° Although this argument is convincing to
a degree, Standard 4.33.3 applies to all places of public accommoda-
tion, not just movie theaters; thus, the fact that "lines of sight" is a
term of art in this industry does not necessarily mean that the term
was used in the same way in the regulation. While it is not unreason-
able to think that theaters could understand the term "lines of sight"
to encompass viewing angles, neither is it persuasive to read a specific
industry's term of art definition into a regulation applicable to many
different industries with different perspectives on viewing angles. The
plain language of the regulation alone cannot have provided notice of
the viewing-angle requirement.
The Justice Department next contends that, from the promulga-
tion of the Standards in 1991, theater companies had actual notice that
extreme vertical viewing angles detract from the quality of viewing
experience based on industry understandings of acceptable viewing
angles."' Again, this argument standing alone does not demonstrate
that theater companies had notice of the requirements of Standard
4.33.3. Having actual notice that a certain viewing angle produces a
partment began investigating theater companies in September of 1998 for noncompliance with
Standard 4.33.3).
117 See United States v One Parcel of Real Property with Buildings, Appurtenances, and
Improvements Known as Plat 20, Lot 17, Great Harbor Neck, New Shoreham, RI. - C.A.1 (R.L),
960 F2d 200, 211 (1st Cir 1992) (explaining that it is "well-settled that the government need not
acquiesce, on a nationwide basis, in one circuit's construction of federal law adverse to the gov-
ernment's interpretation of the law").
118 See generally Justice Department Hoyts Brief (cited in note 7).
119 See id at *9-12 (referencing the Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers
(SMPTE) guidelines issued in 1989 and adopted by National Association of Theater Owners,
which include viewing angle in the definition of lines of sight).
120 See id at *49-57.
121 See id at *49-53.
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markedly inferior viewing experience has nothing to do with whether
or not an auditorium is in compliance with the ADA. Indeed, the Jus-
tice Department has admitted that it does not assert a qualitative re-
quirement for what the viewing angle should be, as long as angles are
comparable for disabled and able-bodied patrons:
[T]he Department does not adopt [a] 30- or 35-degree measure-
ment as a maximum for wheelchair spaces. If most members of
the audience have seats with vertical viewing angles exceeding 35
degrees, then wheelchair areas also can have viewing angles
greater than 35 degrees. The standard, as the language of Stan-
dard 4.33.3 states, is whether viewing angles are "comparable."'
'
This statement expressly contradicts the contention that theaters had
actual notice of the Justice Department's interpretation of Standard
4.33.3 because they knew that, empirically, the wheelchair placements
provided less desirable viewing angles. It is comparability, and not
quality, that the Standards require. Theater companies cannot be re-
quired to retrofit theaters on this logic.
The Justice Department poses two more compelling arguments in
support of retroactive application, asserting that its amicus brief filed
in the Lara district court provided notice of its interpretation in
1998,' and that architects designing these theaters recommended that
stadium seating be constructed with mid-level entries for wheelchair
patrons in 1997 and 1998.24
While it may seem suspect that the Justice Department's first de-
finitive articulation of this issue comes in the form of a legal brief, this
fact is not fatal to its validity. So long as the interpretation reflects the
Justice Department's fair and considered judgment, it is entitled to
deference. As stated by the Supreme Court under similar circum-
stances, "the [fact that] the [ ] interpretation comes to us in the form of
a legal brief [ ] does not, in the circumstances of this case, make it un-
worthy of deference.'. 2 Similarly, the Justice Department's articula-
122 Proof Reply Brief for the United States, United States v Cinemark USA, Inc, Civil Action
No 02-3100, *10 (6th Cir filed May 8,2002) (Justice Department Cinemark Reply Brief).
123 See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States on Summary Judgment Issues, Lara v Cine-
mark USA, Inc, Civil Action No EP-97-CA-502-H (WD Tex filed July 1998).
124 See Justice Department Hoyts Brief at *55-56 (cited in note 7) (noting that theater
companies were informed by architects to incorporate mid-level entries for wheelchair seating in
stadium-style auditoriums in September 1997 and August 1998).
125 Auer, 519 US at 462. In its petition for writ of certiorari, Cinemark has requested that
the Supreme Court revisit and clarify Auer in light of a purportedly conflicting decision in Chris-
tensen v Harris County, 529 US 576 (2000), where the Court stated that "[i]nterpretations such as
those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style defer-
ence." Id at 587. See also Cinemark Petition at *15-19 (cited in note 13). Cinemark contends that
Christensen extends to briefs, which do not have the force of law, and has cast "considerable
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tion of its viewing-angle argument in a legal brief was not an attempt
"to defend past agency action against attack,"' but rather was re-
quired by the circumstances. When the Justice Department submitted
its amicus brief in the Lara district court upon learning of the theater
company's "unusual interpretation" that Standard 4.33.3 required only
unobstructed lines of sight for wheelchair seating in stadium-style
theaters, the Justice Department stated that it was "reaffirming" what
it contends was the generally understood viewing-angle requirement
imposed by Standard 4.33.3.127
The architects' recommendations of alternatives to older sta-
dium-style designs in 1997 and 1998 '2 further support the contention
that as of late 1998, theaters understood what the language of Stan-
dard 4.33.3 required in the eyes of the Justice Department. Of course,
the fact that architects told theater owners that wheelchair seating
should be placed in the stadium-style section, while prescient, does not
indicate that the theaters were acting illegally."' This is especially true
in light of the method by which the Justice Department chose to assert
this interpretation (namely, litigation). While the Justice Department
prevailed in some district courts, ' it was not until August of 2003 that
any appellate courts accepted the Justice Department interpretation
as controlling. Until that time the most persuasive authority indicated
that the older stadium-style theaters were in compliance with Stan-
dard 4.33.3."' However, the Justice Department's asserted interpreta-
doubt" on the continuing vitality of Auer. Id at *16-19, citing United States v Mead Corp, 533 US
218, 238 n 19 (2001). See also Keys v Barnhart, 347 F3d 990, 993-94 (7th Cir 2003) (noting that
while Christensen does not expressly overrule Auer, "little is left of Auer" after Christensen).
However, even if Auer has been gutted, the unique character of the Justice Department (an
agency that communicates primarily through litigation) indicates that deference may still be ap-
propriate to its briefs. As compared with most cases considering the force of agency briefs, the
Justice Department itself is responsible for both the briefs and the underlying rationale, weighing
against Cinemark's contention that, in this scenario, deference to an interpretation posed in a
brief is inappropriate. Indeed, in Mead itself the Court declined the invitation to defer to an
agency interpretation posed in a brief because the approval of "central management at the high-
est level" did not occur until after the litigation began. Mead, 533 US at 238 n 19. Unlike other
governmental agencies, however, the Justice Department's central management approves the in-
terpretations in briefs each time a brief is filed: no separation exists between the interpretation
and the brief.
126 Auer, 519 US at 462. Compare Bowen, 488 US at 213 ("Deference to what appears to be
nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.").
127 Justice Department Hoyts Brief at *33-34 (cited in note 7).
128 Id at *55-56.
129 See Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 92.
130 The court in Hoyts erroneously stated that there was no decision accepting the govern-
ment's proffered interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 until Meineker v Hoyts Cinemas Corp, 216 F
Supp 2d 14 (ND NY 2002). Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 92. In fact, there was a decision favorable to
the Justice Department as the only precedent on the books from 1998 until 2000-the Western
District of Texas ruling in Lara that the placement of wheelchair seating in the front rows was a
violation of the ADA. See Lara v Cinemark USA, Inc, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 14447, *6 (WD Tex).
131 See Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 92.
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tion was certainly apparent to the theater companies as of 1998, even
if the courts paid it little heed. The theaters would have been well-
advised to begin all new construction in a manner consistent with this
interpretation instead of proceeding with the older layout of stadium-
style theaters on the assumption that the theaters would prevail in a
court challenge.' 3
As of July 1998, theater companies were on notice as to the Jus-
tice Department's interpretation of Standard 4.33.3, and took the risk
that continuing to build stadium-style theaters with wheelchair seating
only in the front rows would later be found a violation of the ADA.
The athletic arenas took the same risk, and suffered the consequences:
[N]or is there any basis for concluding that defendant relied "in
good faith" upon an earlier interpretation of the law or that the
government "led [defendant] down the garden path." On the con-
trary, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that defendant was
well aware that the law might be interpreted to require lines of
sight over standing spectators but chose to ignore that possibility
and proceed with construction notwithstanding.'3
The theaters cannot argue that they had no knowledge of the Jus-
tice Department's interpretation merely because they chose the wrong
horse in the race. Instead, theater owners continued to construct what
are now noncompliant theaters in seeming disregard of the Justice
Department's officially articulated position.' In fact, these theater
owners were acting contrary to private architectural recommendations
that "handicap[ped] seating should be included within the stadium
riser seating area for the benefit of the physically challenged patron.
The availability of equal, optimum site lines [sic] to every theater pa-
tron should be the goal of any plan.' '3 This disregard for the recom-
mendations of both government and private actors suggests a bad-
faith refusal to consider feasible alternatives to the noncompliant
theaters. In light of the clear knowledge of the theaters, retroactive
application to theaters built on or after the filing of the Lara amicus
brief in July 1998 does not violate due process."6
132 See id (referencing a theater executive's statement that "there was enough precedent to
argue in court" that cost reduction was a sufficient justification for "eliminat[ing] wheelchair-
accessible seating in the stadium sections").
133 Independent Living Resources, 982 F Supp at 747 (explaining why, if its decision on APA
noncompliance were overturned on appeal, the court would determine that stadium owners
should be required to retrofit).
134 See Justice Department Hoyts Brief at Schedule B (cited in note 7) (listing theater com-
plexes constructed after July 1998 that were not in compliance).
135 Id at *55-56.
136 Further inquiry is necessary to determine which of the contested theaters should be sub-
ject to this retroactive application. At what point in the design or construction phase would it
have been reasonable to require the theater companies to cease work and recalibrate based on
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C. The Justice Department's Abdication of Its Rulemaking Role
"In a regime in which a regulation may be interpreted in several
permissible ways, regulated parties may find it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to plan their affairs with confidence until the regulation has been
definitively interpreted by the agency. 137 Almost all of the courts that
have grappled with this question have come to the same begrudging
conclusion:"g although the Justice Department is entitled to deference
to its interpretation, and is not required to commit it to code,'3 it
would save a great deal of time, money, and judicial resources if the
Justice Department undertook notice and comment rulemaking to
clarify the meaning of Standard 4.33.3. It is nearly impossible for the
theater companies to comply with their obligations under the regula-
tion when the Justice Department is allowed to assert its interpreta-
tions piecemeal (through litigation, sometimes only as amicus). Fur-
thermore, the courts have done little to clarify matters, imposing their
own viewing-angle and seat-placement requirements. "' Moreover, the
decisions and briefs frequently cite informal seat-selection surveys,
decades-old theater design treatises, and highly specialized viewing-
angle data,' presenting very technical considerations that are neither
the province nor expertise of the judiciary.'
This piecemeal approach has made at least one theater company
(and likely more, given the national scope of many theater companies)
this newfound knowledge of the requirements of Standard 4.33.3? How this line is drawn in-
forms the relative "fairness" of retroactive application-if only the auditoriums that were not so
far along in design or construction as to be feasibly (and without undue cost) reworked are af-
fected, retroactivity is more palatable. This uncertainty further supports the contention of this
Comment that much of the confusion and unnecessary expense that follows these decisions is
based on the Justice Department's pressing of this interpretation through litigation rather than
rulemaking. See Part III.C.
137 John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpreta-
tions of Agency Rules, 96 Colum L Rev 612, 671 (1996).
138 See, for example, Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 92 ("The best way to bring about nationwide
changes in the configuration of stadium-style theaters is to promulgate a new rule after a period
of notice and comment."); Caruso, 193 F3d at 737 ("The DOJ could, of course, adopt a new sub-
stantive regulation to require that wheelchair users be given lines of sight equivalent to standing
patrons-and such a rule certainly has much to recommend it-but to do this it must proceed
with notice-and-comment rulemaking.").
139 Although the ADA does require the Attorney General to issue TAMs (in compliance
with the APA) to assist entities in understanding their responsibilities, 42 USC § 12206(c)(3), it
does not require that TAMs, now outdated and of little assistance, be kept current.
140 See, for example, Hoyts, 256 F Supp 2d at 93 ("To be clear, to comply with Section 4.33.3,
wheelchair seating cannot be located solely in the traditional section, nor solely in the access-
aisle, nor solely in both the traditional section and access-aisle.").
141 See, for example, id; Cinemark, 348 F3d at 575-79 (examining viewing-angle and viewer-
preference data); Justice Department Hoyts Brief at *15-20 (cited in note 7).
142 See Independent Living Resources, 982 F Supp at 746 ("The courts are ill-equipped to
evaluate such claims and to make what amount to engineering, architectural, and policy deter-
minations as to whether a particular design feature is feasible and desirable.").
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beholden to varying requirements in different judicial districts."3 Fur-
ther, these determinations are simply too fact-specific and tied too
closely to individualized preferences to be dealt with by the courts.
Indeed, several opinions have pointed to this problem as requiring
that courts decline to apply the Justice Department standards until the
regulations are amended.'" What is really required is a deliberative,
comprehensive process, with input from the industry, patrons (both
disabled and able-bodied), architects, and the like, about cost, feasibil-
ity, and seating preferences. Until that time, both wheelchair users and
theater owners will be constantly in conflict over what the ADA and
the Standards require.
4
As noted, this problem will eventually be rendered moot by thea-
ter companies' constructing stadium-style theaters that now integrate
wheelchair seating into the stadium-style section (through either ele-
vators or different configurations), meeting the Justice Department's
viewing-angle and integrality concerns. The older theaters that must
be retrofitted to comply with these requirements are a very discrete
143 Cinemark USA owns and operates theaters that are in the jurisdiction of both the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits, currently on opposite sides of the circuit split.
144 See Lara, 207 F3d at 789 (declining to require district courts to "interpret the ADA
based upon the subjective and undoubtedly diverse preferences of disabled moviegoers"); Regal,
339 F3d at 1137 (Kleinfeld dissenting) (noting that the Standards contain to-the-millimeter
specifications for knee space under desks and the like, which are clearly not rivaled by the
majority's intimations about comparability).
145 The Access Board began such a process in 1992 for sightlines over standing spectators
in athletic arenas, Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, Proposed Rule
for Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Building and Facilities;
State and Local Government Facilities, 57 Fed Reg 60612, 60618 (Dec 21, 1992) (amending
36 CFR § 1191), and later for comparability of viewing angles in stadium-style theaters, 64 Fed
Reg at 62277-78 (cited in note 24), and will issue its final amended regulation in mid-2004.
See Access Board Approves New Guidelines under the ADA and ABA, online at
http://www.access-board.gov/news/ADA-ABA-update.htm (visited May 16,2004). While the Ac-
cess Board cannot be lauded for swift action, it nonetheless took some action. In contrast, the
Justice Department has initiated no rulemaking process, despite the decade of controversy that
surrounds Standard 4.33.3. It first pressed a contested interpretation of Standard 4.33.3 in the
1994 TAM Supplement requiring lines of sight over standing spectators, see note 105, and the
first case challenging that interpretation was filed in July 1996. See Paralyzed Veterans of Amer-
ica v Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engineers; PC, 950 F Supp 393 (D DC 1996), affd as DC Arena,
117 F3d 579. In 1998, the Justice Department first publicly advocated that comparable lines
of sight required comparable viewing angles in Lara. Nonetheless, no rulemaking has
been mentioned. The Department of Transportation, which serves the same function for
public transportation facilities as the Justice Department does for public accommodations, 42
USC § 12186(a)(1), published a notice of its intention to adopt the Access Board's revised
ADAAG in August 2000. See DOT Moves to Update Its ADA Standards, online at
http://www.access-board.gov/ada-aba/dot.htm (visited May 16, 2004). The Justice Department
still has not undertaken any rulemaking on this issue, even in the face of an express request to do
so from the theater industry. See Steven John Fellman, TheADA:A Crying Example of the Need
for Regulatory Reform, In Focus (June 2003), online at http://www.infocusmag.com/03June/
washreport.htm (visited May 16, 2004) (discussing the National Association of Theater Owner's
Citizens Petition requesting that the Attorney General issue a rule clarifying Standard 4.33.3).
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category-those constructed after July 1998. However, in light of the
Justice Department's inability to commit a definitive statement of this
issue to code, theater companies will remain at the mercy of the Jus-
tice Department's changing will. Until the Justice Department fulfills
its statutory role of assisting affected entities in understanding their
responsibilities under the ADA,"' this Standard (and indeed the Stan-
dards as a whole) will continue to be disputed in litigation across in-
dustries, disadvantaging all involved.
There is no question that the Justice Department's interpretation
of the Standard through adjudication is within the bounds of current
doctrine. ' However, courts would be well-advised to consider holding
the Justice Department to its rulemaking obligations in situations like
this. Currently, the Justice Department has no incentive to undertake
the lengthy and laborious process of notice and comment rulemaking
because it has succeeded in articulating its interpretation through a
litigation campaign. There is no doubt that the Justice Department is
achieving the right results (albeit to some disadvantage to the thea-
ters) by pressing the viewing-angle requirement for stadium-style
theaters. However, while in some instances interpretation through ad-judication is appropriate and necessary, initiating a calculated litiga-
tion campaign in lieu of rulemaking is an abuse of the Justice De-
partment's role.
CONCLUSION
The placement of wheelchair seating in older stadium-style movie
theaters violates the ADA because it does not provide wheelchair us-
ers with lines of sight comparable to able-bodied patrons.
However, important questions remain unanswered: What viewing
angles are acceptable? Which auditoriums require retrofitting? And
do theaters that comply with the viewing-angle requirement but seg-
regate wheelchair seating from the rest of the auditorium violate the
ADA and the Standards? Only the Justice Department-by clarifying
the Standards' meaning through notice and comment rulemaking-
can produce a definitive answer invulnerable to revision by a change
in sentiment or development of superior theater design. Until that
time, courts will revisit this issue again and again, and these questions
will remain unsatisfactorily resolved.
146 42 USC § 12206(a)(1).
147 See SEC v Chenery Corp, 332 US 194, 201-02 (1947) (setting forth the principle that
agencies have substantial leeway in choosing between proceeding by rulemaking or
adjudication).
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